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Christianity but with the disadvantage that on this view God is less likely to be justified in permitting evil. In other words, the open view faces
the same difficulties as traditional Christianity but with fewer resources
to meet them. That does not strike me as an advantage.
Despite the laudable concern these authors have for developing a
position that is both biblically sound and adequate for a rich religious
life, the view they present, as I have tried to make explicit, is not only a
radical departure from traditional Christianity but it is a departure not
justified by the reasons they cite in its favor.
NOTES
1. One of the authors, William Hasker, in God, Time, and Knowledge
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) interprets this prophecy
not as conditional but as a prediction "based on foresight drawn from existing trends and tendencies" (p. 194). Under either interpretation it is possible
for the prophecy to be made but to be unfulfilled, either because the relevant
condition-whatever it is-is unsatisfied or because the current trends are
reversed or overridden.
2. J.T. McNeil's The History and Character of Calvinism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954) is not primarily a history of the doctrine of
theological determinism!
3. See his God, Time and Knowledge and "A Refutation of Middle
Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986): 545-57.
4. See Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Freedom," Philosophical
Studies 60 (1990): 103-115 and "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism,"
Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991): 237-243, as well as Alfred J. Freddoso, "Review
of William Hasker: God, Time, and Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993):
99-107.
5. Calvin, Institutes, I, xvii, 7.
6. Ibid. I, xvii, 11.
7. A similar claim may be made about the evils Hasker cites on p. 146.

The Sources of Christian Ethics, by Servais Pinckaers OP. Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995. Pp. xxi and 489.
$24.95.
JAMES G. HANINK, Loyola Marymount University.
"It is difficult," Pinckaers notes, "to describe a situation while living in
the midst of all its complexity ... " (304) It's perhaps equally hard to identify a classic within a decade of its writing and a year of its translation
for Anglophone readers. Still, Pinckaers's Sources is a contender.
The author, a Belgian, teaches theology at the University of Fribourg.
Sources appeared as Les sources de la morale chretienne in 1985, and
Pinckaers tells us he wrote it for a broad audience. His text is straightforward and ambitious. Pinckaers first defines Christian ethics and then
examines its relation to the behavioral sciences, to Scripture, and to the
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teaching of Augustine and Aquinas. Next he charts the history of his
subject from the patristic era to the post-Vatican II period. Lastly, he
explores the relation between freedom and law and between freedom
and nature. In this he presages John Paul II's Veritatis Splendor.
When one reviews a (maybe!) classic, sobriety is in order. How do it
justice? Simplicity is best. I first note what I simply omit from discussion. Then I identify the parts of the text which I want to underscoreand do so. Finally, I consider two issues (among many) which demand
further analysis.
What must I simply omit? Too much: Pinckaers' account of Paul's
Christocentrism; his charting of Christian ethics over two millennia; his
view of Catholic-Protestant debates. The price of economy is high. It
was, after all, Vatican II's call to reintegrate moral theology and
Scripture (though not, he warns, via technical exegesis) that inspired
Pinckaers. Yet apart from his reading of the Sermon on the Mount, conciseness must rule. It is this rule, however, that allows me to underscore
five of Pinckaers' key themes and point to their significance.
For a start, what is Christian ethics? Pinckaers defines it as "the
branch of theology that studies human acts so as to direct them to a loving vision of God seen as our true, complete happiness and our final
end." (8) He immediately adds that we win this vision "by means of
grace, the virtues, and the gifts [of the Spirit], in the light of revelation
and reason." (8) The definition is critical for what it says and for what it
omits. It focuses on neither law, nor duty, nor a subjective happiness,
nor a schema of values, nor conscience. Its strength, rather, is a recapitulation of the sources of Christian life and a recognition of its telos: the joy
of knowing God.
Our next step is to ground Christian ethics in Scripture, in particular,
the Sermon on the Mount. For Augustine the "Sermon of the Lord"
announces Gospel ethics "based on the Lord's own words." (142)
Pinckaers develops Augustine's reading of the Sermon as the primary
text of Christian ethics and his teaching that only in the Spirit can we follow Christ's way to happiness. This hermeneutic is noteworthy in that it
does justice to the radical character of the primitive Christian ethos. It
does so, moreover, in harmony with the trinitarian dynamic which the
Fathers articulated. With Pinckaers, one never wonders about the force
of Christian ethics; the question is how to order its power.
A third theme Pinckaers pursues is the disordering of the dynamism
of Christian ethics that emerges from the nominalist turn. Here Ockham
is the chief player. Ockham's conceptual brief, though, leads us beyond
the claims that only individuals exist and that universals are but labels.
His freedom, Pinckaers finds, is "the power to choose between contraries, independently of all other causes except freedom, or the will
itself-whence the term freedom of indifference." (242)
Such freedom isolates the human act from both its agent's past and
future. Virtue and finality fall away. Obligation supplants natural inclination. But obligation itself stems from God's will. Indeed, to preserve
God's freedom, Ockham teaches that "God can command the created
will to hate him" in this world and the next. (247) So the wisdom of
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sequi naturam yields to the paradoxes of a Divine Imperative. Ockham's
impact, for Pinckaers, is huge. Only too soon Christians begin to see
their moral legacy through "nominalist lenses." (253)
This "revision" is at issue when we compare Ockham's freedom of
indifference with Aquinas's "freedom for excellence." Mapping this
contrast is the fourth of Pinckaers' key themes. For Ockham, he notes,
freedom opposes natural inclination and law; it is, in a sense, brute selfassertion independent of the agent's character. For Aquinas, however,
we find free choice in the developing interplay of reason with will; it
expresses an inclination for what seems good, and wise law serves its
development. Without virtue freedom is farce, and absent the finality of
happiness freedom has no direction.
Pinckaers's basic argument for freedom of excellence is that it reflects
the intricate fabric of our experience. Part of that experience is our quest
to show it intelligible. Aquinas offers a way intelligibly to join who we
are with how we (best) live. His ethics seeks to account for the dynamics of our anthropology. But if we divorce ethics from anthropology, we
forgo a deepening reflection on the ways of life that realize our nature,
and do so only for an elaborate exercise in the arbitrary.
This last claim, of course, itself expresses the Christian view that our
nature is not arbitrary. Rather it is made in the image of God. As rational and free, we are persons and it is in our personhood that we image
God. Indeed, Pinckaers affirms, and we see this as the fifth of his key
themes, that "Natural law is the foundation of human rights, as it roots
them in our personal nature." (452) With this claim, explicated by
Revelation's Good News about God's nature and involvement in ours,
Pinckaers goes to the core of his praxis. He parallels John Paul II's
Veritatis Splendor with its harmony of freedom, nature and grace.
A classic begins or reshapes deep projects. Does Sources? Pinckaers
rethinks the Christian tradition in light of the primacy of happiness. He
illuminates insights of the tradition to dispute now dominant assumptions about freedom. But a classic equally invites still more analysis, so I
will suggest two lines of inquiry.
First, the "free will defense" has long played a key role in responding
to the problem of evil. But if we understand freedom as motivated by
natural inclination, why does not God create us with less confused inclinations? Or why not, at any rate, with less confusion about them? It is
not that to be free we must act independently of inclinations; indeed,
they make our freedom possible. But the plot thickens: suppose God
makes it clear wherein perfect happiness lies or even that a particular
action is required for that happiness. If this be so, will we surely not
choose happiness or at least the action that it requires? But how then are
we free? In reply to the thickening plot, Aquinas says that we might yet
will not to think of happiness or its requirements and that there is a real
distinction between acts of will and of intellect. (395) But should God
have willed this distinction? The discussion is not over.
Pinckaers does not write in the analytic mode. And yet one would
like him to address the logician's view of freedom as a three-place predicate: S is free from C to do A. Determinists deny freedom because, they
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say, its negative condition is not met. Causality reigns. Compatibilists
allow for freedom if the causes at issue are within the agent. But that
proviso strikes libertarians (and others) as empty. Still, what are we to
make of actions that are "authored" by a libertarian self both metaphysically and historically unimaginable?
For Pinckaers, we become free. We do so in becoming free from what
impedes the cooperation of reason and will and thus free for the good
which attracts us. So we are neither determinists nor libertarians. But
are we compatibilists? Surely not in a Humean sense; perhaps not in
any sense. What, then, is the Christian view in the modern context?
How do we engage the established disorder if our identity is unclear?
La lotta continua.

Faith and Criticism, by Basil Mitchell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
Pp.173. $29.95 (Cloth)
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, Syracuse University
The central problem dealt with in this book is whether openness to criticism is compatible with the strong commitment essential to religious
faith. Mitchell approaches the problem by contrasting what he calls liberals and conservatives in theology. Evincing keen awareness of the ambiguity of these terms, he stipulates the following understanding .
. .. within all the mainstream churches there is a sharp division
between those who take it for granted that Christian theology
should be studied critically with the aid of all the resources of
modern scholarship and with due attention to all that is received
as knowledge in the modern world [liberals], and those who
resist this trend as destructive of the historic faith of Christians
[conservatives] (1)
Mitchell's presentation of this contrast is notable for bringing out the
way in which fundamentalists and radical thinkers like D. Z. Phillips
share a rejection of the possibility that extra-religious knowledge could
overthrow Christian faith, despite their very different versions of this
conviction.
The central issue of the book then emerges from a conservative criticism of liberal theology.
Christian faith is unconditional. It demands our complete and
whole-hearted allegiance. But to allow Christian belief to be
exposed to criticism implies that criticism might turn out to be
fatal. Once it is allowed that faith is, in principle, vulnerable to
criticism, its character is bound to change. In place of the total
commitment which is demanded of Christians we have a faith
which is tentative and provisional. (4)

